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Two of the most
influential texts about the rise of nationa-
lism both present arguments about nation-
hood based on technological changes: To
Benedict Anderson (1991), the main prota-
gonist in the historical drama of nationa-
lism is print capitalism, which creates con-
ditions for an abstract simultaneity and cul-
tural homogenisation. Currently raised
questions regarding the implications of the
internet for social identity can easily be rai-
sed with his analysis as a point of departure.
To Ernest Gellner (1983), the movement
from agrarian to industrial society was cru-
cial for the emergence of an overarching
ideology of unity in a large-scale society, al-
ong with its concomitant organisational
principles of anonymity, exchangeability
and so on. While Gellner concentrates on
the integrative and functional dimensions
of nationalism, Anderson’s focus is on the
symbolic power of nationalism, that is, its
existential meaning – Gellner explains how
nationalism is integrative at the political le-
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vel of the industrial state, while Anderson
explains the emotional power of nationa-
lism at the personal level. In this way, the
theories are complementary rather than
competing. 
The canonical literature on nationalism,
moreover, emphasises the quality of natio-
nalism as a horizontal ideology of similarity,
as an ideology transcending regional and
class difference, and as a relational ideology
defined and confirmed through contrast
with non-nationals (Eriksen 2001). The re-
lationships of nationalism to ethnicity, to
minority issues and to issues of race have
been carefully researched and theorised in
the last decades of the 20th century, but
this has not – surprisingly – generally been
the case with the gendered aspect of nati-
onhood. Indeed, with a handful of excepti-
ons (notably Yuval-Davis and Anthias
1989, Yuval-Davis 1997, Mosse 1985, Par-
ker et al. 1992, Archetti 1999), the gende-
red dimension of nationhood has largely
been neglected in the literature. Apart from
a brief remark by Anderson (1991) compa-
ring national identity to gender identity,
none of the standard texts take it into acco-
unt, and it is often taken as an implicit pre-
mise that nations are essentially male; cre-
ated by male pioneers, run by male politici-
ans and defended by male soldiers. This im-
plicit assumption needs to be problemati-
sed. What I am going to do in this brief es-
say amounts to outlining a few of the large-
ly untheorised gender aspects of nationho-
od. The main objective is to indicate ways
in which a critical approach to gender can
be incorporated into existing analytical per-
spectives on nationalism. I will argue that
gender feeds directly into nationalism at a
variety of levels, and the argument presup-
poses (a) that metaphors are based on ex-
periences, (b) that those experiences are
gendered through fundamental relation-
ships based on socialisation and sex, and (c)
that sexual capital is a main scarce resource
during situations of stress for the nation
(e.g. mass immigration or war). What I am
looking for, in other words, are symbolic
connections between widespread personal
experiences and symbolism referring to lar-
ge-scale entities (viz. nations).
GENDER SYMBOLISM IN
CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IMAGERY
Metaphors are a device, perhaps the main
device (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), conven-
tionally used by humans to simplify the
world, giving it a particular shape and ma-
king sense of experience. Abstract pheno-
mena such as God, the market and the nati-
on depend for their existence on meta-
phors drawing on widespread, often taken-
for-granted personal experiences. The mea-
nings of metaphors, moreover, change situ-
ationally. This entails that if there is a sym-
bolic connection between images of gen-
der, family and the individual on the one
hand, and images of the nation on the ot-
her, the latter is likely to vary cross-cultu-
rally as an implication of variations in the
former. One may thus assume a priori that
in a matrilineal and patriarchal society, the
dominant image of the nation will differ
from that prevalent in a society based on
bilateral kinship and relative gender equali-
ty; similarly, that endogamy at the level of
the kin group may reappear as “endogamy”
at the national level. Before considering
such possible variations, I shall outline some
general principles regarding the metaphori-
cal relationship between gender relations
and nationhood.
Gender and kinship terms figure promi-
nently in portrayals of aspects of the nation,
in common terms such as fatherland, mot-
her tongue, brothers and sisters (of the na-
tion) and so on. Less obviously, it may also
be argued that the nation is imagined me-
taphorically as a person (which passes thro-
ugh life stages, emerges out of personal cri-
ses etc.), a household or family, a male gro-
up of comrades, or a local community or
Gemeinschaft. There are in other words a
bundle of metaphors relating the nation to
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primary relationships; all can be invoked,
depending on the situation at hand. 
In the introduction to Nationalisms and
Sexualities, the editors (Parker et al. 1992)
claim that the nation is an eroticised image,
and refer to the concept of “love of nati-
on”. I disagree with this interpretation. Of
all the gender relationships that form a
symbolic foundation for nationhood, the
sexually charged bond is actually the least
conspicuous. As argued below, sex enters
into national imagery exogamously toget-
her with violence, through the idioms of
conquest and rape, not through notions of
love. The dominant symbolic idiom is
rather that of parents and children, which
implies the predominance of the sibling re-
lation rather than conjugal love or sexual
intercourse. In peaceful times, the nation
chiefly belongs to the domestic sphere. It is
a wife, sister, mother or daughter who runs
the risk of being violated by foreigners or
subversive elements from within; and it is a
father or brother seeking to protect his fe-
male family members. Mrs. Thatcher, when
she made her infamous remark that “there
is no such thing as society”, very sensibly
added that there are individuals and fami-
lies. 
In the script of the nation-as-family,
each family member has his or her own pe-
culiar part to play: 
The mother is typically represented as
the guardian of tradition and the reprodu-
cer of the nation. In a typical photo of In-
dian immigrants to Mauritius taken about a
hundred years ago, all the women wore sa-
ris, while all the men wore Western clothes.
The term mother tongue exists in many
languages, but no language I am aware of
speaks of “father tongues”; this makes sen-
se in so far as mothers, rather than fathers,
tend to be mainly responsible for the eve-
ryday socialisation of children. The nation
as such is often represented as a loving and
caring mother, as in “Mother India”. 
The father is typically represented as a
hardworking farmer tilling the land (which
is feminine, cf. Yuval-Davis and Anthias
1989) or as a military officer in command
of a troop of soldiers (his sons). The land
cultivated and patrolled by fathers is some-
times described as a fatherland or Vater-
land. A couple of representative lines from
the Norwegian national anthem go like
this: “As our fathers have fought, our mo-
thers have wept” (Slig fædrene har kjæmpet,
og mødrene har grædt).
The ideal son and brother is represented
as fraternal to his brothers (in horizontal
relationships), obedient to his parents and
protective of his sister. In their vertical rela-
tionship to the State, all men are represen-
ted as sons (of the nation).
The sister and daughter, finally, is given
the most passive role in this nuclear family
of the nation. Her primary task seems to
consist in readiness to make sacrifices. 
The Hitler Youth Movement had two
mottos, one for girls and one for boys. The
girl motto was: “Be faithful, be pure, be
German”. The boy motto was: “Live faith-
fully, fight bravely, die laughing” (Yuval-
Davis 1997, 45). Sons/brothers are active;
daughters/sisters are passive. Boys are ac-
tive in public; girls remain in the domestic
sphere.
During the war of words following 11
September, George W. Bush said: 
“I recently received a touching letter that says
a lot about the state of America in these diffi-
cult times, a letter from a fourth-grade girl
with a father in the military. ‘As much as I
don’t want my dad to fight,’ she wrote, ‘I’m
willing to give him to you.’ This is a precious
gift. The greatest she could give. This young
girl knows what America is all about.”
(George W. Bush, 7 October 2001) 
The female principle in nationhood, expres-
sed through the relational statuses of wife,
daughter and sister, is caring and nurtu-
ring, but it is also passive, like a fertile field.
The complementary male principle is acti-
ve; it is that of the farmer and soldier. 
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GENDER DYNAMICS IN RELATIONS
WITH OTHERS
Nations change gender situationally. Their
female dimension is foregrounded when-
ever they appear as victims, but also in the
continuity of tradition. Children, the sym-
bolic future of the nation, are associated
with women. The female principle is thus
not exclusively passive. The male principle
of activity and aggression predominates in
industrial development and social planning,
and more generally in the State’s use of for-
ce against criminals, subversive elements,
minorities, foreign enemies and so on.
Could it be said, then, that in some na-
tions, the female principle predominates,
while the male principle is more obvious in
others? From what I have said so far, this
ought to be the case. Hierarchical gender
relations would then symbolically feed into
aggressive nationalism. Indeed, George
Mosse (1985) has convincingly argued that
there were important connections between
domestic relations in Germany and the
growth of aggressive nationalism in the
1930s. However, other factors must also be
taken into account. For example, it would
seem likely that small and/or poor countri-
es have a less boisterous and expansionist
national selfimage than large and/or rich
countries. The Scandinavian countries are
often seen as somewhat effeminate in their
official emphasis on cooperation rather
than competition, their considerable efforts
in Third World development, and their
active role in peace negotiations. In their
case, their small size is complemented by
relative gender equality. It would neverthe-
less be easy to find other examples which
indicate that there is no simple causal link
between size, economic power and domes-
tic gender arrangements on the one hand,
and dominance of a particular gender in
national imagery on the other – although it
is clearly more easy for a small and poor co-
untry to embrace the victim role than for a
large one; and although domestic gender
equality can lead to a general femininizati-
on of politics and thus an “effeminate”
national image. This is an area where tho-
rough empirical work needs to be done. 
Although gender imagery of nations has
been granted little attention in academia, a
considerable body of research shows that
ethnic minorities, notably indigenous peop-
les, have often portrayed themselves as fe-
male: they are, as it were, nonaggressive,
cohesive and non-competitive, soft-spoken,
peaceful and harmless. In ethnopolitics, not
least among circumpolar peoples and
North American Indians, indigenous peop-
les often represent themselves as carriers of
more humane principles than the “insensi-
tive macho majority nation”.
Indigenous peoples, moreover, are also
sometimes associated with a “higher ecolo-
gical morality” than the expansionist, indu-
strial, utilitarianist majorities. Actually, in
majority/minority relationships there is a
nature/culture dimension which is both
gendered and ambiguous. For example: (i)
Blacks and Arabs are perceived (not neces-
sarily by themselves, but by their significant
others) as sexually aggressive – they are ac-
tive and male, but also closer to nature
than the more refined, civilized “We”. (ii)
Indigenous groups are effeminate, irratio-
nal and weak. (iii) Elites/middle classes,
however, are also frequently seen as effemi-
nate by working classes and peasants. In a
racialised country such as Jamaica, blackness
symbolises masculine strength, while brown-
ness symbolises effeminate weakness; blacks
empirically tend to be working class, and
browns tend to be middle class. Generally, it
could be said that minorities, working classes
and women are naturalised, and the ambigu-
ity concerns whether nature is male or fema-
le. This changes situationally. In Mauritius, a
society defined on the basis of the Hindu/
Creole contrast, Hindu men tend to view
Creole men as feminine (irrational, spontan-
eous); while Creole men tend to view Hin-
du men as feminine (sexually weak). Both
derogative attitudes contain elements of
both cultural prejudice and naturalisation.
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Designating enemy nations, competing
groups or subject peoples as essentially fe-
minine is very widespread. Ashis Nandy
(1983) has noted that colonised people we-
re consistently depicted as weak and effemi-
nate by the colonial powers. The sexualisa-
tion of colonised peoples took place in the
literal sense through massive sexual abuse
of slave women, and metaphorically by re-
garding them as “weak” – not just political-
ly, but in other senses as well. The standard
late 19th century social Darwinist view,
which was incidentally shared by Darwin
himself, was that when two peoples settled
in the same area, the superior race would
gradually displace the inferior race. Being
more fit, it would have more surviving off-
spring than the weaker people. 
Some oppressed people have responded
to naturalisation from outside by naturalis-
ing themselves as strong and active men
rather than weak and passive women. A
compelling description of machismo am-
ong black South Africans opposed to
apartheid is the centrepiece of Andre
Brink’s The Wall of the Plague (1984), a
novel which describes the complexities of
social classification through a romantic, but
tense encounter between a black man and a
white woman. The dominant African-
American identity is also based on a strong
version of machismo; and the same could
be said of the dominant ethos among Latin
American peasants. In other words, a re-
sponse to a depiction from an oppressive
Other as “naturally feminine” can be to re-
define oneself as “naturally masculine”.
THE NATION AT WAR
We now move to considering tense in-
tergroup situations fraught with conflict
and struggle. It is quite clear that, not-
withstanding their gender ambiguity and
hermaphroditic inclinations in peaceful pe-
riods, nations tend to become overwhel-
mingly male during war. That is to say:
When they are attacked, they are vulnerable
women whose sexual honour is under thre-
at; when they retaliate or attack others,
they appear as male. Thus, when Bush Jr.
talked about meeting violence with calm
justice (as he did on 20 September, two
weeks before the attacks on Afghanistan
began), he drew on a set of symbols which
are rarely used during war: He spoke of the
USA as the cultured (and passive) country
opposing the natural (and active) terrorists.
This speech was nonetheless only a brief
and surprising intermezzo of calmness en-
gulfed by aggressive talk of crusades, infini-
te justice and aggressive war on terrorism. 
The mutual accusations and propaganda
speeches of the USA and Osama/Taliban
before and during the American campaign
in Afghanistan are highly instructive of the
gender identity of a nation at war. Both ac-
cused each other of being cowards, not be-
ing real men. The Taliban, notably, taunted
Americans by suggesting that they were
womanlike and afraid of death. A Taliban
officer said, just before the onset of the rain
of bombs, that “Americans love Pepsi-Cola.
We love death.”
In his first, and most famous, interview
with the independent Al-Jazeera TV chan-
nel, recorded shortly after the 11 Septem-
ber attacks, Osama bin Laden said: “From
our brothers who fought holy war in Soma-
lia, I have heard how surprisingly weak,
vulnerable and cowardlike American soldi-
ers are. After only eight of them were kil-
led, they packed their bags in the darkness
of the night and fled without looking
back”.1
Bush Jr., for his part, said (10 October):
The USA “is strong and determined and
generous”. A few days earlier, he had ac-
cused the terrorists of seeking (female) pas-
sivity: “Initially the terrorists may burrow
deeper into caves and other entrenched hi-
ding places” (7 October), and in the same
speech, he spoke of the US campaign as
one marked by “determination, and will,
and purpose”.
In Bush’s speeches before and during
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the attack on Afghanistan, the term “ag-
gressive” crops up regularly. Although this
is usually a word with negative connotati-
ons, its meaning changes during war: “All
law enforcement and intelligence agencies
are working aggressively around America”
(Bush 7 October). “We are aggressively
pursuing the agents of terror around the
world, and we are aggressively strengthe-
ning our protections here at home” (10
October). Soldier qualities such as enduran-
ce and courage are also invoked: “We will
rally the world to this cause by our efforts,
by our courage. We will not tire, we will not
falter, and we will not fail” (21 September).
On 21 September, Bush also made a
detour to the essentially domestic imagery
of peaceful nationhood, insisting that busi-
ness should go on as usual in spite of the
state of emergency: “Americans are asking:
What is expected of us? I ask you to live
your lives, and hug your children. I know
many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask
you to be calm and resolute, even in the fa-
ce of a continuing threat.” However, he
added, not casting any doubt about the
gender of a nation at war: “Our grief has
turned to anger, and anger to resolution.”
Osama said, around the same time: “If a
target of attack should appear to Muslims
thanks to God’s grace, then it must be eve-
ry single American man. He is our enemy,
whether he fights directly against us or just
pays his taxes.” Now, Osama bin Laden
and the Taliban are poor models of nation-
building. Their project is not nationalist,
but blends politics and religion in ways that
makes it difficult to grasp their objectives
from a territorial, nation-centred point of
view. In the quoted interview (all Osama
quotations in this section are taken from it)
and elsewhere, Osama bin Laden has repe-
atedly accused the USA of arrogance, and
his plea for justice does not seem to amo-
unt to, say, an end to imperialist exploitati-
on or replacing pro-Western lackey regimes
with Islamist governments. Rather, he de-
mands respect and recognition for his
brand of Muslim “holy warriors” as equal
men: 
“Take a chicken. If an armed person penetra-
tes a chicken’s home with the intention to
harm her, the chicken will inevitably resist.
(...) the Palestinians, once famous for their la-
boriousness and their agriculture and citrus
fruits and production of soap, have now be-
come a people of refugees and slaves to the
colonizing Jews, who now decide where they
may go.”
Osama also explains that: 
“... by the grace of God I have joined forces
with a great number of my brothers in the
International Islamic Front to take on the
struggle against the Jews and the crusaders.
In my view, many of these brothers are mo-
ving in the right direction ...”
In this imagined community, there is no
place for women or – presumably – male
homosexuals. The absence of the domestic
sphere and gender relations from Osama/
Taliban public statements is puzzling.
(When asked, a Taliban spokesman once
explained the absence of women from offi-
cial positions, by saying, “how can you
trust a person who bleeds on her own ac-
cord for several days every month?” This is
a rare comment on gender relations from
the Taliban.) The image created is that of
an all-men, all-holy warriors, all-Jihad
world, although the feminine principle is
present, as something abhorrent, in the
description of the symbolically castrated
Palestinians and the humiliated Arabs who
have to witness the presence of American
fighter planes in the land of the Prophet.
To sum up, the nation becomes em-
phatically masculine in situations of violent
inter-group competition, with a feminine
dimension as a back-drop and the symbolic
violation of “our women” as a justification
for violence. 
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NATIONHOOD AND ENDOGAMY
The previous comments concern the mas-
culine/feminine dimension of nationhood
in conflictual international relationships. I
now turn to another aspect of gender sym-
bolism in nationalism, namely that pertai-
ning to procreation and the (symbolic and
biological) reproduction of the nation. It is
assumed that a role of women consists in
reproducing the nation both biologically
and culturally, and that their sexual activiti-
es are monitored by men. Many nations are
based on ethnicity (i.e. imputed kinship) in
the sense that biological impurities are seen
as tantamount to contamination of the na-
tion. In the USA, unlike in the Caribbean
and elsewhere, the “one drop principle”
still regulates race relations: if you have
three white grandparents and one black
grandparent, you are considered black. In-
tercaste marriages are problematic in India
for similar reasons of contamination. I
mention this because endogamy does, of
course, not apply only at the international
level. What chiefly concerns us here, howe-
ver, are the ways in which sexual violence is
used to symbolise national enmities; and,
by extension, the relationship between
(symbolic and real) endogamy and exoga-
my in recruitment and reproduction. 
Along with the more obvious literal
slaughter of enemy soldiers, rape is the ulti-
mate act of war and perhaps its most potent
metaphor, as the recent Balkan wars have
reminded us. A bestseller in the USA du-
ring the Gulf War was entitled The Rape of
Kuwait. In a study of pre-revolutionary Ir-
an, Gustav Thaiss (1978) noted that the
public metaphors used by Iranian revoluti-
onaries were strongly sexual and gendered,
with “Uncle Sam” featuring as the great ra-
pist. The revival of an Islamic way of life, of
the Muslim family, and (as a consequence)
the toppling of the Shah regime, were thus
seen as a necessary reaction to the massive
rape inflicted on Iranian society by the
West. Similarly, the protection of the virtue
of one’s metaphoric sisters is the ultimate
patriotic act by men. Characteristically,
neo-Nazi leaflets often describe how black
men (naturalised by referring to their pro-
verbially uncontrollable sexual desires and
large penises) violate the essentially inno-
cent blonde and blue-eyed daughters of the
nation, calling for immediate retaliation by
men of a patriotic bent. The opposite type
of relationship – white men and black wo-
men – is never mentioned in this material.
In nationalist imagery as elsewhere, the
golden rule seems to be that sperm is cheap
while eggs are expensive.
In this context, the nation appears as a
unit of procreation and perceived threats
from the outside as sexual threats to the
virtue of the nation as woman. “American
imperialism” and “westernisation” often
get this part, as dirty, immoral and insistent
seducers or rapists penetrating the inner
sanctum of domestic bliss through advertis-
ing, television and so on. Cultural nationa-
lism is a typical counterreaction.
A more literal case from my own coun-
try is this: During the German occupation
of Norway from 1940 to 1945, many Nor-
wegian girls had affairs with German sol-
diers. Some of them had children with
them. These children, who in most cases
grew up in Norway without knowing their
fathers, have suffered unspeakable humilia-
tion and stigmatisation. Some were put in-
to asylums for no apparent reason; others
were by default considered mentally retar-
ded and placed in special classes at school;
some actually fled the country in order to
escape the inevitable stigma. A leading
psychiatrist in post-war Norway even stated
that the girls who had affairs with Germans
were generally below average concerning
intelligence. The denigrating term tyskertøs
(“German’s tart”) is still commonly used.
As late as 2001, the plight of the “war chil-
dren” was taken up by several media (in-
cluding the BBC), and it was suggested
that they might receive some form of com-
pensation from the State. At the time of
writing, no decision has been reached, and
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in any case any compensation would be too
late to save their lives, since they are ap-
proaching retirement age. This example
could serve as a reminder of the strong pas-
sions aroused by the heady mix of foreign
(potential enemy) powers, sex and procrea-
tion involving na-tive women.2 The virtue
of protecting one’s own country against
foreign powers is literally embodied in at-
tempts at “protecting” women of one’s
own nation against foreign seducers.
A very different view of nationhood is
prevalent in some parts of the world, per-
haps especially in the Americas. According
to this ontology of the nation, natives can
be created through immigration and assi-
milation. Eating local food as a means to
become a kinsperson is often associated
with certain Papuan peoples, but this is al-
so seen as a significant act of inclusion in a
country such as Argentina (Archetti 1999).
This model of nationhood, in other words,
is exogamous: Foreigners do not pose a
threat so long as they can be domesticated;
indeed, they bring vitality into the nation.
In the USA, the term “naturalisation” is
used about changes in citizenship in the
USA, but not in Europe. Although the
term may exist juridically, hardly anybody
speaks of “naturalised” Danes, Germans or
Brits. To put it simplistically, it may seem
as if the “New World” nationalisms which
take immigration past or present as a ne-
cessity for the nation’s vitality, see the pe-
rils of inbreeding as a greater problem than
the contamination of domestic genetic ca-
pital. 
In an increasing number of countries
(“New World” or otherwise), mixing or
hybridisation is widely seen as an expression
of creativity and sexual energy. This is clear-
ly the case in Blair’s multiculturalist “Cool
Britannia”, and in postcolonial, polyethnic
Trinidad & Tobago, the quintessential sexy
woman is a “red woman”, that is a girl of
mixed African–European origins. White
girls even get perms to look more like
“red” girls. This aesthetic represents the
opposite of the “one drop” principle. On
the other hand, the most marginal charac-
ter in the national cast of Trinidad & Toba-
go is without doubt the dougla, a person of
mixed African-Indian heritage. In other
words, not all kinds of openness, mixing or
exogamy are encouraged even here. 
The general issue here concerns degrees
and forms of endogamy and exogamy at
the national level: Which forms of genetic
mixing with outsiders are encouraged, and
how do such values feed into the over-
arching ideology of abstract nationhood?
An additional question concerns possible
gender differences.
MAKING THE WORLD LESS
AMBIGUOUS
The bellicose language recently employed
by the Bushes and the bin Ladens of the
world portray the current conflict as one
between good and evil, between hero and
coward, between freedom and terror (or
between virtue and decadence), between
perpetrator and victim. As Bush himself put
it: “In this conflict, there is no neutral gro-
und” (7 October) and, most infamously:
“Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists” (21 September).
In this binary world of black and white,
all shades of grey are suspect. Homosexua-
lity thus poses an obvious threat in this
cosmological scheme of things. Among all
the subversive jokes that have circulated on
the net since 11 September, one is particu-
larly memorable: It is a manipulated photo
portraying bin Laden and Bush Jr. in a ho-
mosexual act. Just as the nation is imagined
as bounded, sovereign and inherently limit-
ed, there is an analogous drive to make
gender boundaries and sexual practices
clear and unambiguous. Unproductive
sexuality, notably homosexual practices,
cannot be seen as nation-building in any
way: They fail to reproduce the metaphori-
cal foundation for the nation (the family,
with its complementary roles) and even
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more obviously, they fail to reproduce the
nation biologically. 
A FEW GENERAL REMARKS ON IDENTITY
In this brief and programmatic paper, there
are numerous issues I have not dealt with
at all, since the focus has been on the sub-
stantial connections between gender and
nationhood, that is the various ways in
which nations are gendered. The most
obvious omission is probably the relation-
ship between theories of nationhood/eth-
nicity and theories of gender. There are
many parallels between majority/minority
relations and gender relations, to do with
symbolic power, muting and so on. Allow
me therefore to end with some general re-
marks on the double movement of inclu-
sion and exclusion inherent in all processes
of identification. Given that nations are re-
lational (just like gender, and minority/ma-
jority relations, and class), there are some
formal features shared by these and similar
identity formations. 
There is a tension between analogue
and digital aspects of identity: The ana-
logue refers to a continuum with no sharp
boundaries and large fuzzy areas; the digital
to the either-or aspect. As every student of
ethnicity and nationalism knows, these
identities can be seen as attempts to trans-
form a world of many small differences and
gradual transitions into a world of few, lar-
ge differences and sharp boundaries. In
Marxist theory of class, large groups in
contemporary society are ambiguous, in-
cluding most public servants (neither bour-
geois, petty bourgeois nor working class).
From my youth, I remember a heated argu-
ment in a Norwegian Marxist party about
the class membership of nurses – whether
they were bona fide workers or not. Con-
cerning theories of gender, homosexuals,
“mannish” women such as Mrs. Thatcher,
and many other groups are ambiguous.
Just as the “hybrids” and “creoles” in theo-
ries of ethnicity tend to be glorified, femi-
nist theory tends to encourage an analogue
view of gender – and in both cases, it must
be said, with a limited success outside of
academia. Unlike the theories of class,
which were fashionable a short generation
ago, current theories of group identity, in
so far as they have a normative element,
tend to nudge the social world towards a
less rigid, less bounded state than what is
commonly assumed.
In gender theory as well as theories of
nationhood, there is also a tension between
horizontal and hierarchical aspects of relati-
onship. In one sense, nations are related to
each other horizontally; that is in essence
what the principle of sovereignty amounts
to. In another sense, everyone knows that
there are enormous power discrepancies
between countries. Gender relations are
usually construed as hierarchical by feminist
scholars, but they can also be viewed as ho-
rizontal in two ways: As complementary
(that would be the view of “difference fe-
minists”, whose thinking is reminiscent of
“difference multiculturalism”) or as sym-
metrical (anything a man can do, a woman
can do at least as well). In popular dis-
course, gender relations are almost eve-
rywhere seen as chiefly complementary and
hierarchical. Similarities with majority/
minority relationships are many and obvi-
ous, but one important difference is that
many dominant majorities have extermi-
nated minorities physically – it would be
difficult to envision a male-dominated so-
ciety wishing to do so to women, although
it could be argued that the Taliban, depri-
ving women of their personhood, come
close.
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“The Clasp of Imperial Trade”.
Illustration fra Anne McClintock: Imperial
leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the
Colonial Contest. New York, Routledge, 1995.
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Finally, both gender and national/eth-
nic identity has a personal dimension and a
political one. It is sometimes said about po-
liticized religion such as Indian hindutva or
political Islam that they take the religiosity
out of religion. In this, it is implied that the
essence of religion lies in its capacity to ge-
nerate deep personal experiences, which are
interfered with and ultimately destroyed
when religion becomes politicized. Similar-
ly, both nationhood and gender identity
clearly have an important existential, emo-
tional dimension which serves to define the
bearer as a person. Both kinds of identity
are also politicized, like virtually any identi-
ty these days. Gayatri Spivak’s controversial
notion of “strategic essentialism” (pretend
that you believe in bounded groups for po-
litical reasons, Spivak 1988) can be invoked
by both feminists and ethnic activists. Alt-
hough it is commonly assumed that gender
identity is primarily personal while national
identity is primarily political, these two di-
mensions – the instrumental and the sym-
bolic – merge in prac- tice. 
Ambivalence and fundamentalism; op-
enness and closure; analogue gradients and
digital contrasts; equality and hierarchy;
symbolic meaning and political power –
these and other binaries can be identified as
significant in almost any process of identifi-
cation. What I have endeavoured to show
in this sketchy contribution, is that any ac-
count of nationalism must look for other
modes of identification with which the na-
tional identity is articulated, and that gen-
der is the most obvious one. Unlike what
some of the “culture and personality” theo-
rists of the interwar years may have believed
(such as Mead 1935), I do not think a
change in gender relations would be suffici-
ent to change the form and content of a
national identity, but until proven wrong,
there is good reason to believe that it wo-
uld help. 
NOTER
1. This quotation, and the many that follow, from
bin Laden and Bush were reproduced during Sep-
tember–October 2001 in many media. All of them
can be consulted in Norwegian in Morgenbladet‘s
special issue on 11 September (Morgenbladet
2001). All are easily available from a variety of sites
and in assorted languages on the World Wide Web
as well.
2. Any sex involving Norwegian men and German
women would presumably be treated in a more
relaxed way. See Warring (1994) for a Danish per-
spective on the same issues.
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SUMMARY
Although nationalism has been extensively
theorised in the last decades, it is rarely seen
in relation to gender. The article addresses
this shortcoming and identifies a number of
clearly gendered aspects of nationalism. At
the level of symbolic imagery, nations have a
male (largely active) and a female (largely
passive) pole, and family metaphors incorpo-
rating a gendered division of labour are
common. Gender symbolism is particularly
poignant in the context of war and state-
ments from Bush and Osama bin Laden af-
ter 11 September are applied to show how me-
taphoric sexual violation and masculine ret-
ribution serve to justify war.
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, dr.polit., 
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